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Rethinking Technics and the Human 
An Experimental Reading of Classic Texts on Technology 
Atsuro Morita 
Osaka University 
Introduction 
Technics 1  has long been held as the major feature distinguishing the human 
species from animals. Although this position already looks obsolete in the light of 
the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, which regards the complexity of social 
relations in primates as a driving force of the evolution of intelligence (Byrne & 
Whiten 1988), the notion that technical activity provided motive power for the 
evolution of the human mind, the vision of homo-faber, predominated in the 19th 
and early 20th century. In this paper, I will try to shed new light on the 
relationship between technics and the human by re-reading classic, or even 
obsolete, texts by F. Reuleaux, M. Mauss, L. Mumford, and A. Leroi-Gourhan. 
These texts can be regarded as precursors to science and technology studies (STS) 
and, although such texts present certain challenges to the readers of today, they 
are obviously important legacies for the anthropology of technology. 
                                                           
1
 I use the word “technics” to denote technical activities and artifacts. It is prudent to deliberately 
avoid using the contemporary term “technology”. In particular, as we will see in a later section, M. 
Mauss used this term to mean the study of technical activities and artifacts. He also defined 
techniques as actions aimed to produce a certain technical effect. To avoid confusion with the 
Maussian use of technology and include technical objects that are excluded from techniques in 
the Maussian sense, I use “technics”, which is taken from L. Mumford’s classic book Technics and 
Civilization (Mumford 1934). 
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My reading is thus experimental. Rather than trying to restitute the whole 
of these authors’ thoughts, I will try to generate new insights by experimenting 
with these texts in the present context. 
Obsolete Texts 
It seems out of place to raise questions about the evolutionary relationship 
between humanity and technics in STS and anthropology today. For authors such 
as Mauss, Mumford, and Leroi-Gourhan, however, human evolution and technics 
were central concerns. Even so, just as anthropologists these days find J. Frazer’s 
texts almost unreadable, few STS researchers are seriously interested in writing 
from before the early 20th century. 
It is not surprising that contemporary readers may find these texts difficult 
to understand, exploring as they do the relationship between technics and the 
human long before current interests in science and technology were shaped. Their 
aims range from giving systematic descriptions of machines and artifacts 
(Reuleaux; Mauss) to reconstructing the history of human evolution to answering 
the longstanding question of the priority between the mind and technical activity 
for human nature (Mumford; Leroi-Gourhan). These interests clearly fall beyond 
the purview of current STS and anthropology. 
In addition, the texts seem even more odd when we find the need to puzzle 
out the contexts that ground these texts. For example, Leroi-Gourhan starts his 
famous work Gesture and Speech, which emphasizes the role of language and 
technics in the development of human intelligence, by detailing the evolution of 
animal body structures from the radial symmetry of hydras through to the bilateral 
symmetry of vertebrates. It is quite difficult for contemporary readers to 
immediately understand why he would open the argument this way. Eventually, it 
becomes apparent that his argument on language and technics is based on the 
evolutionary formation of the human and primate anatomical structures that 
configure the brain regions responsible for the control of hands and vocalization 
in closely related primates (Leroi-Gourhan 1993). That the presuppositions of 
Leroi-Gourhan’s argument were shared by evolutionary biologists in the 1950s 
and 1960s is almost completely forgotten by anthropologists these days. 
As in the example just given, what makes these authors’ texts seem so 
strange is their common interest in evolution. With the exception of Reuleaux, 
whose interest was strictly limited to mechanical engineering, the authors were 
interested in technics because of an assumed close relationship to human evolution. 
This sets their accounts in extraordinarily long time frames. They 
elaborate their arguments by drawing on the history of civilization and human 
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evolution which, for them, stretches back at least 100,000 years. This lengthy 
temporal contextualization is the main point of divergence from contemporary 
anthropology and STS; it is what makes these texts obsolete today. 
It would be unthinkable for contemporary anthropologists and STS 
researchers to locate their argument in the entire history of human evolution. 
Leroi-Gourhan and Mumford’s contextualizing moves toward human evolution 
sharply contrast with the empiricism of STS and anthropology today. Actor-
network theory, for example, insists on naturalistic descriptions of scientific and 
engineering practices and on adopting the actors’ own categories rather than 
imposing those of the analyst ones (Latour 2005). 
According to this methodological premise, ANT’s scope tends to be 
limited to immediate contexts and connections, particularly those that the actors 
themselves recognize. From the ANT viewpoint, conjuring up contexts outside the 
actors’ perspective jeopardizes the endeavor to describe heterogeneous 
connections made within practice. As A. Tsing argues, ANT, which sticks to the 
connections the actors describe, deliberately avoids exploring relations beyond the 
actors’ perspective (Tsing 2010: 47). 
Contextualizing Moves 
Consequently, what makes these texts obsolete is not simply the passage of time, 
but rather the discrepancy between the contextualizing moves in them and the 
ones employed today, the ways in which we deal with context (Dilley 1999). M. 
Strathern’s discussion on context is helpful for understanding this contrast 
between past and present arguments. She argues that 20th century anthropology 
has taken the contextualization of knowledge as one of its epistemological 
foundations (Strathern 1995: 3). The modernist ethnography initiated by 
Malinowski radically departed from its predecessor, the evolutionary 
anthropology represented by Frazer, by introducing a new way to organize 
ethnographic texts, that is, by putting things in context. Although both of them 
were faced with the same challenge of making bizarre ideas of “savages” 
understandable to Western readers, their strategies in response to the challenge 
were nearly opposite (Strathern 1987). 
Malinowski set out to discover ordinariness behind the bizarre appearance 
of the customs and practices of Trobrianders by putting them in context. He stressed 
the importance of understanding the object of inquiry within a greater life context, 
which is the society and culture the ethnographer describes. Advocating fieldwork, 
he created holistic social and cultural contexts in which indigenous ideas were 
found (Strathern 1987: 259). The comparison of these contexts makes it possible for 
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readers to manipulate familiar ideas in the service of understanding alien ones. Thus, 
for example, an ethnographer can describe the unfamiliar practice of marriage 
payment (buying a wife) by turning upside down his/her own categories that 
correspond to it. That is, while “we” regard payment as antithetical to kin relations, 
“they” regard kin relations as based on transactions (Strathern 1987: 260). This 
contextualizing move generates distinct relationships among the writer, the reader 
and the object of study. Modern anthropology constructs the context surrounding 
the object of study as alien to the readers’ own society, or context, and sets the 
fieldworker between the two contexts as a mediator. Malinowski’s strategy of 
putting things in context introduced a distance between the writer, the reader, and 
the object of study that had not existed in Frazer’s texts (Strathern 1987: 269). 
Instead of constructing the context surrounding the object, Frazer drew 
readers’ attention to the resemblance between bizarre practices of savages and 
descriptions in familiar texts such as the Old Testament. While Malinowski created 
distance between readers and the object of study in order to put the latter in context, 
Frazer drew on familiar texts and contexts he shared with readers. Rather than 
discovering civilization in savagery, as Malinowski did, Frazer revealed savagery 
within civilization by presenting commonalities between the object of study and the 
ancient Israelite customs described in the Old Testament, which his readers 
regarded their own way of life to be descended from (Strathern 1987). 
So, the texts I discuss here do not comply with the modern anthropological 
convention of contextualization. Rather than creating social and cultural contexts 
for their object, they attempt evolutionary explanations with deep time spans, or 
introduce other connections based on mechanical engineering. But I think that, 
just as reading Frazer can help elucidate distinctive features of modernist 
anthropology, reading classic texts concerned with the anthropology of technics 
can shed light on our own ways of contextualization. Because modernist 
anthropology regards the social as the primary context in which its object, diverse 
humanity, is found, these obsolete texts can be particularly thought-provoking for 
those of us interested in reconsidering the social and methodological issues 
generated when we consider the human. 
Moreover, this line of inquiry will also contribute to the clarification of the 
methodological differences between STS (particularly ANT) and anthropology. A. 
Tsing argues that a salient difference between the two disciplines is in their 
attitudes toward context. While anthropology mobilizes a wide range of relations 
surrounding the object of study regardless of the actors’ own recognition, ANT 
deliberately avoids appealing to contexts outside of the actors’ perspective (Tsing 
2010). Borrowing R. Dilley’s classification of contextualizing moves, ANT 
strictly limits itself to appealing to internal context, which is the relation among 
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signs within a given system of signification (Dilley 1999: 12). This self-limitation 
coheres with ANT’s semiotic tendency to see heterogeneous actants in science 
and technology as analogous to agents in texts. In texts, there is no distinction 
between human and non-human agents that continually come into being, fade 
away, move around, and change places with one another, and so on (Pickering 
1995: 12). In contrast, A. Tsing argues, most anthropologists also consider what 
Dilley calls external context, the coherence between one social domain (language, 
for example) and another (the world). This paper aims to shed light on the 
difference in contextualizing moves taken by the two approaches studying a third 
move alien to both of them. 
As I introduce the lines of thought on technics and the human found in the 
works of F. Reuleaux, M. Mauss, L. Mumford, and A. Leroi-Gourhan, you may 
occasionally find that texts resonate with some of the contemporary interests in 
STS and anthropology. For example, Reuleaux and Mumford’s arguments 
profoundly influenced the notion of machine developed by G. Deleuze and F. 
Guattari, which has recently provided new insights in STS and anthropology 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1983; Jensen & Rödje 2010; Viveiros de Castro 2010). Even 
though the relationship between these authors and Deleuze and Guattari might be 
of greater interest to a broader audience, I will explore these classic texts on their 
own terms. The aim of this paper is both to use these texts to shed new light on 
the relationship between the human and technics, and also, by comparing the 
contextualizing moves employed by these texts and contemporary anthropology 
and STS, to reflect on the methodological issues generated by these past inquiries. 
From Reuleaux to Mauss 
Now at last it is possible to link up the ideas of Franz Reuleaux, the 
German founder of a purely mechanical technology, with the ideas of 
Powell, founder of an ethnographical technology. There is a brilliant 
future of this science, which we cannot anticipate (Mauss 2006: 52). 
The first person I discuss is a mechanical engineer who worked in 19th century 
Germany, F. Reuleaux. Because he was strictly interested only in mechanics 
related to engineering, you may wonder why his writing is worthy of discussion in 
an anthropological paper. Well known as the founder of kinematics and for his 
formulation of Reuleaux’s triangle, which later became the configurational basis 
of rotary engines, he was one of the most influential scholars at a time when the 
modern theory of mechanical engineering was forming. His best known work is a 
distillation of a wide variety of mechanisms that illustrate simple principles 
regarding the relative motions of parts. The 300 beautiful models he made of basic 
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mechanisms are still well known and regarded as a fundamental achievement of 
mechanical engineering. He also formulated the following definition of machines, 
which today still appears in textbooks of mechanical engineering. 
A machine is a combination of resistant bodies so arranged that by their 
means mechanical forces of nature can be compelled to do work 
accompanied with certain determinant motions (Reuleaux 1876: 35). 
This statement is repeatedly quoted in texts concerned with technics and 
the human, from Mauss and Mumford to Deleuze and Guattari. It is interesting 
that his narrow concern with mechanical engineering has had such a lasting 
influence on the philosophical and social scientific arguments about the human. 
The answer might lie in the relational feature of this simple definition. In this 
statement, a machine is primarily defined as a relational object. A machine 
consists of parts that impose constraints on each other’s movements. Through 
these mutual internal mechanical constraints, the external input of energy, the 
“mechanical force of nature”, causes the machine to do a certain kind of work 
accompanied with a certain form of motion. What attracts authors such as Mauss 
and Mumford is the very relationality that this definition implies. 
Mauss was the most influential scholar who explored Reuleaux’s notions 
in social science. Although until recently not widely known outside the 
Francophone world, Mauss had a lasting interest in techniques throughout his life 
(Schlanger 2006). His main aim was to develop an ethnographic method to 
describe technical activities and lay out the material base of society. The latter aim 
was clearly related with social morphology (Mauss 2005), an underdeveloped 
branch of Durkheimian sociology, which virtually disappeared from sociology 
after Mauss.2 However, as seen in the epigraph of this section, Mauss hoped for 
future social studies of technics that would coalesce around Reuleaux’s work and 
ethnographic studies of non-Western technics.3 
His vision had two methodological pillars. First was his conceptualization 
of technology as a specific sort of action. He defined technique as “traditional 
actions combined in order to produce mechanical, physical and chemical effect, 
these actions being recognised to have that effect” (Mauss 2006: 98). As is clear 
from this statement, he regarded technology as part of a wider category of social 
action called traditional effective actions (actes traditionnels efficaces), which 
                                                           
2
 As examples of Durkhiem’s social morphology, see his contributions to L’Année Sociologique 
(Durkheim 1980). For the position of social morphology in Mauss’s reconstruction of Durkhemian 
sociology, see Mauss (2005). The common assessment of social morphology, which analyzes the 
spatial formation of social groups and the “linkage between humans and things in the space”, is 
that it was subsequently absorbed into demography and human geography. 
3
 He refers to the works of O. Mason and J. Powell, who were museum-based anthropologists in 
the late 19th century and founded the Bureau of American Ethnology (Mauss 2006: 51–52). 
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includes magic and legal acts as well (Mauss 1972). This line of thought leads to 
his familiar discussion of techniques of the body, culturally shaped ways of 
walking, eating, sleeping, and so on, that focus on the relationship between the 
formation and transmission of techniques and collective life in a specific social 
group (Mauss 2006). 
Then Mauss also aimed to build a systematic method to describe the 
relationship between techniques and technical objects that could complement 
Reuleaux’s kinematics. After briefly discussing techniques of the body in his 
lecture on technology in the 1930s, he introduced the detailed classification of 
technical objects, or as he called it “instrument(s?)” 4 , in a way obviously 
influenced by Reuleaux’s work. This line of investigation led to unfamiliar 
arguments that seem to stray outside Durkheimian sociology. 
He devised a three-part classification of “instrument”. The first category is 
“tools”, each being an indivisible instrument made from a single material. Among 
other things, this category includes chisels, wedges, and levers. The second 
category is the collective noun “instrument”, each of which comprises a 
combination of tools. A knife, for example, is formed from a blade and a handle. 
The third category, “machines”, consists of a combination of instruments. Mauss 
cited a bow and arrow as an example. The tip, shaft, and flights of an arrow are 
propelled by the frame and string of the bow: a bow and arrow work together as a 
single machine. As is already clear from above, Mauss’s conceptualization of the 
“instrument” focuses on its composite nature. In this regard Reuleaux’s influence 
is obvious. 
However, his true interest lies in the integration of a systematic description 
of technical objects and social relations. As he said in a lecture: 
A pure technology (study of techniques), like that of Franz Reuleaux, has 
every right to limit itself to mechanical techniques […] There is another 
approach to technology, that of the historian of civilization. We have not 
only classified things in relation to the internal logic of mechanics, 
physics or chemistry; we have also grouped them according to the social 
contexts to which they correspond” (2006: 114, emphasis added). 
Here Mauss introduced social context. The context he subsequently 
discusses differs, however, from the collective life or social groups that he 
referred to in his earlier essay on techniques of the body. Instead of collective life, 
Mauss presented “industry” as the context for techniques and instrument. By this 
term, he indicated “an ensemble of techniques that combine towards the 
satisfaction of a need” (emphasis original) rather than a specific domain of 
                                                           
4
 Mauss uses “instrument” as a collective noun for technical objects in general, while using the same 
word as a countable noun for the specific sub-category of the former delineated in this passage. 
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economic activity, as the conventional use of the term implies (Mauss 2006: 114). 
As techniques are already defined as a specific type of traditional effective action, 
an industry in the Maussian sense denotes a chain of actions aimed toward a 
specific end. A hunting industry, for example, consists of the production of 
instruments such as the bow and arrow, the domestication of horses and dogs used 
in hunting, the bodily techniques used while hunting, the organization of hunting 
teams, and the distribution of the kill. 
Industry as context does not necessarily overlap with society and culture. 
Mauss mentioned the long-distance trade of materials, particularly mineral 
resources, as a part of this chain. But what is most interesting in his theory of 
technics is the mutual relationship between industries and instrument. According 
to Mauss, to study a single item of instrument, it is necessary to investigate a 
whole industry. Here, we observe a contextualizing move similar to that of 
Malinowski. Mauss also emphasized that the instrument is inseparable from its 
social context. 
Present-day readers might look askance, however, on his subsequent 
discussion on the relationship between technical objects and activities. Mauss 
drew attention to the parallel between the constitution of the instrument and 
industries. He discussed intricate relationships among technical activities and 
objects mediated by the division of labor and the composite nature of the 
instrument. This broached both the division of labor and the coordination of 
techniques in industry, and also how the instrument mediates techniques. For 
example, a machine’s internal relations among components, instruments and tools 
in this case, reflect the relationship among technical activities required to 
manufacture them. On the other hand, these technical activities are also connected 
to each other in a way that is mediated by the very composition of the machine. 
Therefore, he does not treat the object/context relation in such a way that figures 
the social relations surrounding a black-boxed object, but rather he explores the 
intricate relations between the external social relations and the internal relations of 
the object. This makes reading this part of his text difficult for readers accustomed 
to modernist anthropology. 
Mauss’s detailed examination of instrument and industry is an attempt to 
integrate his study of the social context of techniques with Reuleux’s theory of 
mechanics. His analysis of the relationships between social relations external to 
technical objects and the mechanical relations internal to them blurs the boundary 
between the inside and outside of objects. This line of argument is further 
advanced by L. Mumford, whose work is also influenced by Reuleaux. 
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Mumford: Fusing Internal and External Contexts 
Now to call these collective entities machine is no idle play on words. If a 
machine be defined, more or less in accord with the classic definition of 
Franz Reuleaux, as a combination of resistant parts, each specialized in 
function, operating under human control, to utilize energy and to perform 
work, then the great labor machine was in every aspect a genuine 
machine (Mumford 1967: 191). 
As a well-known American literary critic, historian and philosopher of 
technology, L. Mumford left a major mark on social studies of technics in the mid 
20th century. Among his wide-ranging interests, the history of machines is a 
theme that repeatedly appears in his writings. In Technics and Civilization, an 
early work that helped establish his reputation, he aimed to reconstruct the history 
of technics in the West, focusing particularly on the development of machines. In 
this early study (Mumford 1934), however, he showed little interest in Reuleaux’s 
definition of machines. He later turned to Reuleaux’s definition in the two-volume 
Myth of the Machine (Mumford 1967). Here, his innovative analysis linked the 
internal relations of machines with their external context: industry in the Maussian 
sense. Among the fascinating discoveries he made during this historical 
exploration were precursors of modern machines in ancient civilizations, 
particularly in Egypt. 
He argues that the first machine was developed nearly 5,000 years ago 
when Egyptian and Mesopotamian kings attempted to build huge monumental 
constructions such as pyramids. He draws readers’ attention to the fact that these 
extraordinary enterprises would require huge amounts of labor and time, even if 
using modern technology. This remarkable achievement was made possible not by 
the mere increase of manpower, but the transformation of it through a huge and 
accurate organization of labor. He calls this gigantic organization the 
megamachine or labor machine. 
He uses the word machine not figuratively but literally. The labor 
organization required to build pyramids worked in precisely the same way that a 
machine works. He argues that human bodies and their skillful behavior are 
analogous to the resistant bodies that compose a machine, and that a combination 
of workgroups, parts of the machine made from human bodies, amplified the input 
of human labor through their coordinated operation. He also emphasizes the 
importance of astronomy and standardization to coordinate parts, and religion and 
coercive means to discipline the workforce. 
Moreover he even argues that the megamachine is a prototype of the 
modern machine invented in the industrial revolution. 
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[I]t is even possible that the modern non-human machine, powered by 
extraneous energies […] might never have been invented, for the 
mechanical agents had first to be ‘socialized’ before the machine itself 
could be fully mechanized (Mumford 1967: 194). 
Although there seems to be no evidence that Mumford knew about 
Mauss’s technology, his megamachine further advanced Mauss’s investigation of 
the relationship between internal relations of machines and their external social 
context. The megamachine, which consists of human groups and their technical 
actions, is equivalent to industry in the Maussian sense. Mumford, who pursued 
the analogy between machines and ancient work organizations, thus brought the 
internal and external relations of machines into continuous connectivity. 
This sort of connectivity clearly departs from conventional notions of 
social context. When society and culture are given as context, there are 
necessarily semiotic connotations because context is thus defined as conditions 
shaping the meaning of the object (Dilley 1999). This notion also implies 
connections between words, things, actions, and so on. These connections can be 
found amongst themselves, such as citations of other utterances (internal context) 
or relations between different sorts of entities such as words and actions (external 
context). Anthropologists locate their object of study within webs of this kind of 
connectivity. However, Mauss’ and Mumford’s moves introduced strictly 
mechanical connectivity into the social realm. 
The composite nature of machines that Reuleaux elucidated plays a pivotal 
role here. He described the systematic connectivity internal to machines and 
Mauss extended this description to technical objects in general. Mauss also 
explored the continuity between the social context of techniques and internal 
mechanical connectivity. Mumford goes one step further when he views the 
organization of labor in ancient civilization as mechanical connectivity. In the 
megamachine, he found everlasting mechanical or machine-like connectivity, so 
to speak, which has no inside/outside distinction and transverses different realms 
from the material arrangement of the workplace to social organization to religion 
and measurement. This vision subsequently attracted G. Deleuze and F. Guattari 
who were searching for a non-representational notion to express connectivity 
shaping life and desire (Deleuze & Guattari 1983). 
Leroi-Gourhan: Memory in Bodies and Machines 
A. Leroi-Gourhan, further blurring distinctions between the semiotic and the 
mechanical, attempted another departure from the conventional way of seeing 
technics and the human. He was trained in the Certification of Ethnology program 
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founded by Mauss in 1930s and did fieldwork and excavation among the Ainu, 
the indigenous people of northern Japan (White 1993). His interests lay both in 
anthropology and paleontology, and he was one of the major successors to 
Mauss’s work on technology. While preserving Mauss’s definition of techniques 
as traditional effective actions, he explored the origin of human techniques 
through the phyletic evolution of vertebrates. 
He defined techniques as patterned sequences and regarded them as a key 
element to connect human biological and cultural evolution. His idea of seeing 
techniques in the intermediate position between the biological and the social 
hinges upon the parallel he found between techniques and language. His own 
analyses of brain science research and the evolution of vertebrate skull structure 
showed that the zones responsible for the control of the face and the hand are 
located in close proximity within human and primate brains. This led him to 
conclude that the development of human technicality, the work of the hands, is 
closely related to that of language, the work of the face 
The origin of language in anthropoids preceding Homo sapiens thus 
seems to have been closely linked with technical motor function. Indeed 
the link is so close that employing as they do the same pathways in the 
brain (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 115). 
Starting from this evolutionary foundation, Leroi-Gourhan further explored 
parallels between techniques and language. For him, techniques were analogous to 
language in terms of its sequential organization involving some sort of syntax. 
Techniques involve both gestures and tools, sequentially organized by 
means of a “syntax” that imparts both fixity and flexibility to the series of 
operations involved (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 114). 
Following this parallel between language and techniques, he examined the 
sequential organization of techniques by focusing on what he called operational 
sequences, patterned behaviors of living organisms that are directed toward 
specific ends or toward responding to external stimuli. He classified operational 
sequences into three stages of evolution. First, there is an automatic form of action 
directly connected with biological nature. He exemplified this in the complex 
behavior of insects. Then there is “mechanical behavior”, which includes 
sequences acquired through experience and education. These sequences are 
recorded in both language and gestural behavior but take place in dimmed 
consciousness located somewhere between self-consciousness and the automatism 
of the first stage. This type of behavior corresponds to Mauss’s techniques of the 
body. Finally, interruption of the second stage evokes processes involving 
language, and leads to the third stage. At this stage, called “lucid behavior”, 
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language plays a central role by helping to repair an interrupted sequence or 
creating a new one (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 230). 
Interestingly, he called these sequential organizations memory, and argued 
that organisms in general have a biological memory that corresponds to the first 
stage of operational sequence. Moreover, what distinguishes the human species 
from animals is the memory of second stage operations. As Mauss noted in his 
Techniques of the Body (Mauss 2006), sequences of mechanical operation are 
transmitted through imitation and learning that occur in the collective life of 
specific groups. Leroi-Gourhan emphasized the role of ethnic groups in conveying 
this kind of memory and saw ethnic groups as functionally equivalent to the 
species in animals. In the course of evolution, animals had diverged into species 
while humans had diverged into ethnic groups. 
Ethnic groups, as bearers of memories, for him became units of evolution. 
Society of both animals and humans would be seen as maintained within 
a body of “traditions” whose basis is neither instinctive nor intellectual but, 
to varying degrees, zoological and sociological at one and the same time 
(Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 220). 
In his zoo-sociology, or social zoology, Leroi-Gourhan aimed to conjoin 
biological and social evolution by focusing on the parallels between animal 
behavior and human techniques. His ambition was to integrate a zoological 
analysis of phyletic evolution based on species with a sociological analysis of the 
development of civilization based on ethnic groups (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 269). 
As well this ambition, he also expanded his notion of memory to include 
machines. He saw a parallel between the evolution of human memory and that of 
machines. First of all, it is obvious that machines perform operational sequences. 
As we have already seen in Reuleaux’s definition of machines, the combination of 
parts constraining each other’s movement generates a certain form of motion. 
Thus, the operational sequences of machines are inscribed in their bodies, or in 
the relations between their parts. Leroi-Gourhan held that a motion inscribed in 
the form of a mechanism is equivalent to the first stage memory of organisms. 
This part of his argument shows a clear resemblance to Mauss’s technology based 
on Reuleaux. Moreover, he even argued that a machine’s memory develops in a 
way that is similar to human memory. The invention of the punch card used in the 
Jacquard loom,5 for example, was cited as the breakthrough to a second stage of 
memory that is externalized and changeable. He also expected that the coming of 
artificial intelligence would carry machine memory into the third stage. 
                                                           
5
 The Jacquard loom can weave different patterns by changing punch cards, which control the 
operation of the machine. The punch card is equivalent to software for modern computers. 
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Through his bold moves towards evolutionary contextualization, Leroi-
Gourhan developed a new way of thinking about technics. By his account, 
techniques are a common denominator for animals and the human species, and 
help expand the notion of memory from psychological to sociological to 
biological to mechanical. It is also obvious that his method of exploration is 
different from contemporary anthropology and STS. Not only does he open up a 
wider field of relationality surrounding the object of study, he also explores 
relations internal to the objects. This inward exploration is based on his view on 
the evolutionary depth, so to speak, found through the detailed morphological 
(anatomical) examination of the object of inquiry: animals, humans, machines, or 
whatever. This view is demonstrated in the following passage on the evolutionary 
nature of human techniques. 
This enmeshing of tools and gestures in organs extraneous to the human 
has all the characteristics of biological evolution because, like cerebral 
evolution, it develops in time through the addition of elements without 
eliminating one another. Earlier we saw that the brain of Homo sapiens 
still preserves all stages acquired since the fish stage, and that each 
stage, overlaid by the next […] (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 242). 
He sees that human techniques, along with physical characteristics, utilize 
earlier stages of development to serve as substrata for new functions. This view of 
layered evolution immediately invokes Frazer’s strategy to persuade readers. 
Based on the similarities found between ethnographic reports and the Old 
Testament, he revealed traces of the lower evolutionary stages in Western 
civilization (Strathern 1987). In a similar manner, Leroi-Gourhan breaks down 
human techniques into layers of different operational sequences, from the first to 
the third stage memories formed during different stages of evolution. This 
resolution is made possible by putting the object of study in an extraordinarily 
deep time span of evolutionary context. By doing so, he delineates internal 
complexities analogous to the mechanical relations described by Reuleaux and 
Mauss’s technology. For Leroi-Gourhan, this exploration of internal complexities 
rests on the parallel between biological evolution and the technical and social 
development of the human. 
Resonance with Current Thought 
Although the texts I have discussed here look almost obsolete today, they still 
attract readers in a strange way. Concepts such as the megamachine, mechanical 
memories, or parallels between techniques and language seem to evoke an 
alternative way to think about the human. In addition, it is also striking to find 
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Mauss, one of the founders of modern social anthropology, drawing a seemingly 
odd parallel between machine mechanism and social relations. As a consequence 
of the exploration of this parallel, Mauss, Mumford, and Leroi-Gourhan locate 
technics in the midst of the strange connectivity that is almost foreign to the 
conventional view on the social. 
Moreover, their arguments, which blur the distinction between internal and 
external relations of objects, invoke the monadological sociology of G. Tarde, 
long held to be the failed rival of Durkheim, Tarde has recently been reread by 
scholars who are seeking a new approach in social science (Candea 2010).6 In the 
same way as the authors I examined here, Tarde’s theory of monadic association 
also draws on analogies between diverse scientific disciplines such as sociology, 
physics, and astronomy (Tarde 1999; Barry & Thrift 2007). Following Leibnitz, 
Tarde argues entities, persons, objects, animals—anything—consists of tiny 
elements, monads, which have a tendency to associate with each other. Calling 
these connections mutual possession, Tarde claims that the focus of sociology 
should be on associations among monads whether they are celestial bodies, cells 
in organisms, individuals in society or anything else. Thus “everything is society, 
every phenomena is a social fact” (Tarde 1999: 58). While Tarde’s metaphysical 
sociology is far bolder, his pursuit of connectivity trespassing inside/outside the 
boundaries of objects clearly resonates with Mauss, Mumford, and Leroi-
Gourhan’s strange explorations of technics inspired by Reuleauxian kinematics. 
This finding might gratify B. Latour, who regards Tarde as a “grandfather” 
of ANT (Latour 2002). It is even ironic to find Tardian aspects in the texts of 
Mauss and Leroi-Gourhan, who are direct successors of his rival Durkheim. 
Indeed, there is a latent conflict between the Durkheimian flavor of their main 
arguments, and the explorations of technics based on Reulauxian mechanics. On 
the one hand, Mauss and Leroi-Gourhan strictly maintain the view that social 
(ethnic) groups are the primary bearers of techniques. The transmission of 
techniques of the body, or second stage memory, through collective life plays a 
pivotal role here. As Bourdieu later developed the Maussian notion of habitus, 
transmission is the primary context that locates techniques within the social 
(Bourdieu 1977). Apparently non-Durkheimian notions of machine-like 
connectivity, however, are introduced by these same writers. In the case of Mauss, 
it seems that the internal relations of machines that Reuleaux lays out were so 
attractive to him that he subsequently deviated from the Durkheimian line. 
This investigation of the relation between mechanical and social relations 
leads to the delineation of machine-like connectivity similar to the heterogeneous 
                                                           
6
 For the recent revival of Tarde, see Barry and Thrift (2007) and Candea (2010). Appreciation 
from Deleuze and Latour played a particularly significant role in this revival (Latour 2002). 
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assemblages that ANT describes. Advocates of ANT have been discussing 
associations among human and non-human entities and exploring how those 
associations shape the world of the social and the natural. In a similar vein, A. 
Pickering’s theory of the mangle elucidates that a scientific fact emerges through 
the formation of a machine-like assemblage, which consists of machines and 
instruments in the laboratory, human skills to operate them, and representations 
such as text and articles (Pickering 1995). This heterogeneous assemblage 
immediately invokes the machine-like connectivity this paper has discussed. 
This reading of classic texts on technics, particularly by juxtaposing them 
in terms of Reuleaux’s influence, is an attempt at contextualization aimed at 
overcoming the difficulties in reading texts that have lost their original contexts. It 
is thus likely that contemporary argument has influenced my reading. The 
similarity of focus, however, between ANT and these classic texts does not signal 
a commonality of method. It is also obvious that the contextualizing moves of 
these classic texts are completely different from both ANT and anthropology. 
While ANT and the mangle strictly limit themselves to the connections made 
visible by the scientific and engineering practices they study (Pickering 1997; 
Latour 2005), the authors of the classic texts indulge in much more grandiose 
contextualizing moves: Mumford, for instance, chose to situate his object of study 
within the whole history of civilization, while Leroi-Gourhan pulled off the 
extraordinary feat of pursuing his inquiry up the entire evolution of vertebrates! 
This evolutionary contextualizing move is also incompatible with modern 
anthropological contextualization. As already mentioned in the previous section, it 
is quite similar to Frazer’s contextualization, which reveals unexpected savagery 
within the civilization. The classic texts on technics also reveal unexpected 
aspects of familiar objects such as machines by associating them with their 
supposed antecedents, including ancient work organizations. 
Interestingly, precisely what makes their exploration of mechanical 
connectivity possible is this evolutionary contextualization. Of course, I am not 
claiming we can or should adopt their wild evolutionary framework in 
contemporary anthropology and STS. But it is worth noting that the unfamiliar 
directions of inquiry they pursue are inspiring when we reflect on our own 
conventional contextualizing moves. 
The stimulation they can provide may help us transcend our current 
circumstances. New fields of inquiry opened by ANT have already become 
common ground for both anthropology and STS (cf. Strathern 1999; Riles 2000; 
Hayden 2003). Now, it is necessary to reflect on the possibilities and limits of 
ANT. The dissatisfaction expressed by Tsing that was cited earlier, is one of these 
reassessments. In a similar vein, G. Bowker, in his examination of Deleuze’s 
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explication of Leibnitz’s monadology, further argues that while ANT opens up 
theoretical possibilities, the approach also has an inherent limit that prevents it 
from fulfilling them. 
It [ANT] provides a theoretical language that simultaneously denies 
insides or outsides for scientific practice: the work of being a scientist is 
precisely the work of bringing science into the world and world into the 
scientific laboratory […] Society is comprised of microbes, scallops, 
people, practices and technology; and each apparently separable unit 
(scientific truth, the technical artefact, the social fact) has the others 
folded into it at some point […] (Bowker 2010: 135). 
This passage calling for a monadological exploration clearly resonates 
with investigations into machine-like connectivity crossing inside/outside 
boundaries that I discussed earlier. However, Bowker made a harsh assessment of 
ANT, writing that it has “failed to carry through on its promise” (Bowker 2010: 
136). He indicates that the main cause of this failure is ANT’s methodological 
principle of “following the actors”. According to him, this has resulted in adopting 
actors’ categories, rather than developing our own (123). He says, “the task now is 
to explore the entities—scallops, electrons, dark matter—we people the world 
with in order to recognize the limits to our own ways of knowing” (124). 
The Reuleauxian exploration of Mauss, Mumford, and Leroi-Gourhan 
points toward the same kinds of exploration that draw on methods other than 
ANT’s way of “following the actors”. Indeed, they made bold interventions 
through their evolutionary contextualizations. Of course, there is a huge difference 
in the degree of reflexivity between the classic texts and contemporary arguments. 
It is obvious that the authors of the classic texts did not have the slightest concern 
about the position from which they made their evolutionary contextualizing 
moves. What we now need is to make a new sort of intervention that is more 
sensitive to the parallels and mutuality between the analyst and analysand. 
Mauss’s technology is also suggestive in this regard. The relationship 
between Maussian sociology and Reuleaux’s mechanics is, to some extent, an 
external one. Mauss tried to establish social technology in order to complement 
Reuleauxian mechanical technology, rather than to integrate both into a singular 
framework. In Mauss’s text, Reuleaux’s mechanics maintains its own 
methodology and otherness. Just as ANT adopts the actors’ categories, Mauss 
kept in his discourse a space to preserve the autonomy of Reuleauxian mechanics. 
Interestingly, this acknowledgement of autonomy subsequently transforms both of 
them. On the one hand, Reuleauxian mechanics underwent a change of meaning 
through location in the social. On the other hand, Mauss’s subsequent inquiry into 
industry was shaped by its relationship with Reuleaux. It is the interplay between 
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Releauxian mechanics and sociological analysis that diverts his analysis from the 
conventional Durkheimian line. 
This reading resonates with Strathernian ethnography, which also rests on 
the interplay between different perspectives and analytical devices. As Hirokazu 
Miyazaki writes: 
Strathern has made use of parallel and contrast between ‘indigenous’ 
and social analysis in her efforts not only to question assumptions behind 
anthropological analytical constructs […] but also extend Hargener’s7 
analytical devices to the shape of her own analysis (Miyazaki 2004: 5). 
As the extension of Hargener’s analysis shaped Strathern’s own analysis, 
Reuleaux’s mechanics shaped Mauss’s exploration of the relation between 
internal mechanical relations and external social relations. On the other hand, 
Reuleauxian mechanics is at the same time located both inside and outside 
Mauss’s framework. The inside/outside relation is thus not only the object of 
study but a key relation that shaped an entire investigation concerned with the 
mutual transformation of semi-autonomous analytical devices. This 
methodological contrivance would be located somewhere between ANT’s 
adoption of the actors’ categories and the classic texts’ external contextualization. 
This third move might inspire our contemporary endeavor to tackle the challenges 
that ANT has opened to us. 
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